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circumstances, leaving only the amount of the alimony to the




Accession is the means whereby a person acquires ownership
of a new thing by reason of its relationship to something else
already belonging to him.' This determination of ownership
may be separate and distinct from the idea of compensation to
some other person pursuant to the general doctrine of unjust
enrichment.2 Thus, if a landowner makes a construction with
materials belonging to somebody else, the ownership of the im-
provement vests in the landowner but subject to adjustment in
favor of the other person for the value of the materials.3 Con-
versely, if a person makes a construction with his own materials
on somebody else's land, the ownership of the improvement vests
in the landowner subject to adjustment in favor of the other per-
son, unless the latter was not a possessor in good faith, in which
event, the landowner can demand demolition of the construction. 4
In the case of Prevot v. Courtney,5 there was such a situation
of improvements constructed by a person who was not the land-
owner, but it was somewhat complicated by the fact that the
property (described as including improvements) was sold to a
new owner after the original owner's election to keep the im-
provements but before they had been paid for. The district court
3. In 1957 the writer had the opportunity to comment on the Supreme Court's
construction of Article 160 and did so in these words: "This kind of statement
can give rise to the impression the Supreme Court wishes to justify whatever it
does in awarding alimony after divorce by denying that the wife, though in
necessitous circumstances, has any right to alimony. Certainly the court cannot
intend this meaning any more than it would be conceivable that the legislatures
since 1827 intended to grant such power to the judiciary. It would seem more
reasonable to recognize that Article 160 creates a right of alimony in favor of the
divorced wife in necessitous circumstances, and gives discretion to the judge only
as to the amount to be paid." The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the
1956-1957 Term-Perons, 18 LOUISIANA LAW REvIEw 24 (1957).
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 498, 504 (1870).
2. Cf. id. arts. 501, 507, 508, 521, 526, 529.
3. Id. art. 507.
4. Id. art. 508.
5. 241 La. 313, 129 So.2d 1 (1961).
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and court of appeal 6 held that compensation was due from the
new (present) owner, but the Supreme Court reversed and con-
cluded that the compensation must be paid by the former owner.
The court of appeal considered the problem to be a "factual
question" and on the basis of the evidence concluded that the
purchaser had elected "to substitute himself" for the vendor in
the payment of this compensation. The Supreme Court's re-
versal is predicated on the "public records" doctrine, 7 which
gives the purchaser valid title to all the buildings and improve-
ments on the land; there was nothing in the records to the con-
trary, nor is this result affected by any knowledge outside of the
records.
As between the original owner and the person who made the
improvements, title to these improvements does not pass upon
the owner's mere election to keep them but only when he makes
payment of the appropriate compensation. 8 Nevertheless, the
purchaser as a third party acquires clear title to the land and all
the improvements, leaving the obligation of payment on the orig-
inal owner.
Analytically, the Supreme Court's decision appears to be
sound. Functionally, it leaves the door open for the original own-
er to obtain a price for the property which includes the value of
improvements and then perhaps to get away without reimburs-
ing the person who made the constructions.
From the foregoing, it would follow that, in order to protect
his interest against any owner of the land, a person who con-
structs improvements should record his title to these improve-
ments. Presumably, this is just as pertinent for the person who
constructs on land which he believes he owns because his title
may turn out to be defective.
Alluvion
One kind of accession of special interest in Louisiana is the
gradual and imperceptible alluvial formation along the banks of
rivers or streams9 or bodies of flowing water.10 For the situa-
6. Prevot v. Courtney, 121 So.2d 561 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1960).
7. McDuffie v. Walker, 125 La. 152, 51 So. 100 (1909).
8. Davis-Wood Lbr. Co. v. Insurance Co. of North America, 154 So. 760 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1934).
9. LA. CMVIL CODE art. 509 (1870).
10. Amerada Petroleum Corp. v. State Mineral Board, 203 La. 473, 14 So.2d
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tion where alluvion is formed in front of the property of several
proprietors, the Civil Code provides that "the division is to be
made according to the extent of the front line of each at the time
of the formation of the alluvion." 11 As a statement of general
policy, one could not ask nor expect a more equitable principle,
but its application becomes very complicated and difficult on ac-
count of the irregularities of width and extension which occur in
alluvial land formations.
In working out a proportionate distribution, two mathematic-
al elements of reference are necessary: (1) the basis in relation
to which the division is to be determined, and (2) the basis for
dividing the land that is to be distributed. The first reference
could possibly be the original acreage of the respective proper-
ties, but the Code specifically fixes this reference as the respec-
tive lineal water frontages. For the second reference, the Code
is silent and simply says "the division [of the alluvion] is to be
made." The reference here could likewise be on the basis of
either (a) acreage of the alluvion, or (b) its water frontage.
Obviously, these alternatives could produce more or less satis-
factory results to the respective proprietors depending on the
haphazard possibilities of the shape of the alluvial formation in
relation to the relative original frontages of the riparian prop-
erties. No single formula could always do justice to everyone's
satisfaction, because the formula which produces a completely
satisfactory result in one situation would produce a very differ-
ent kind of result for an alluvial formation of a different shape.
On three previous encounters with this problem, the Louisi-
ana Supreme Court applied the frontage system of division once
and the acreage system twice. 12 In the latest case of Jones v.
Hogue," the court recognized the difficulty inherent in both the
frontage and acreage methods of dividing alluvion, and while re-
jecting each one as an exclusive reference it adopted a formula
which incorporates them both. In order for an alluvial land for-
mation to be apportioned equitably, the test of fair proportion
should consider both frontage and acreage.' 4 This means that
61 (1943) ; Esso Standard Oil Co. v. Jones, 233 La. 915, 98 So.2d 236 (1957),
noted in 18 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 739 (1958).
11. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 516 (1870).
12. See Note, 21 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 803 (1961).
13. 241 La. 407, 129 So.2d 194 (1960), noted in 21 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
803 (1961).
14. See discussion in Note, 21 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 803 (1961).
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sometimes the court might decide according to frontage, or at
other times according to acreage (as in the present case), or per-
haps by splitting the difference between the results of both the
frontage and acreage formulas.
From the court's point of view, this leaves full leeway for the
individualization of cases according to the irregular and peculiar
formations of alluvion, but where does it leave the attorneys who
may be trying in all sincerity to advise their clients about their
rights so as to achieve an amicable settlement and avoid litiga-
tion?
Another issue in such a case is the determination of the time
at which the division is to be calculated and made. Sedimenta-
tion of alluvion is a continuing process. In the present case,
there existed several government surveys of the area in question,
in between which there had been successive increases in the al-
luvion. The ingenious contention that there should be a series
of successive calculations, making a separate apportionment of
each addition in accordance with the respective surveys, was set
aside as impractical. This would mean apportionment foot by
foot, as it was formed; furthermore, the intervals between the
actual surveys varied between 4 years and 20 years, and the
dates of the surveys do not establish the time of the alluvial
formations. Nor is there any basis for assuming that the forma-
tions always grow with imperceptible regularity. Consequently,
the court established the time for division as the time when the
action was instituted seeking the apportionment.
By the application of these principles in the present case, the
court concluded that "each riparian proprietor will receive his
proportion of the area and at the same time will retain a front-
age on the river."' 5
Servitudes.
"A real or predial servitude is a charge laid on an estate for
the use and utility of another estate belonging to another own-
er."' 6 These fundamental attributes of predial servitudes have
interposed many difficult problems in the development of the law
governing mineral operations, and in the absence of legislation
the courts have sought solutions as the needs arose. In Harwood
15. 129 So.2d at 203.
16. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 647 (1870).
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Oil & Mining Co. v. Black,17 the Supreme Court had to re-estab-
lish two points of law concerning the servitude of passage.
The first point is that the mineral lessee of a bed of a river
cannot claim a right of passage across the adjacent riparian land
by reason of being an "enclosed estate' 8 because the mineral
lessee does not have any property right but only a personal right.
This has nothing to do with the question of navigability of the
river. Would it follow that if he had purchased the minerals ac-
quiring a servitude and a real right or proprietary interest, he
would be entitled to a right of passage within the meaning of
Civil Code Article 699 ?19
The second point involves the public servitude of passage on
public roads along rivers and bayous. In classifying as public
the roads that are built along the rivers and bayous, R.S. 48:491
does not specify that these must be navigable. The court reiter-
ated its position that the statute must be construed with Civil
Code Articles 455 and 665, which limit this servitude to the areas
along navigable waterways, and decided accordingly.
Building Restrictions
It has become well established in Louisiana law that building
restrictions can be imposed upon a specified group of properties
so that the rights of their owners are thereby limited as in the
case of predial servitudes. 20 However, unopposed violations of a
building restriction may destroy the original purpose, and the
restriction is no longer enforceable on the theory of waiver or
relinquishment. 2
1
The case of Guyton v. Yancey 22 involved a subdivision in
which the original owners had included the following building
restrictions: (1) exclusive residential use, (2) minimum house
cost of $10,000, (3) thirty feet clearance from each side property
line, and (4) eighty feet setback from the front property line.
The defendant's proposed construction would have violated the
17. 240 La. 641, 124 So.2d 764 (1960).
18. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 699 (1870).
19. It would have to be shown that one servitude could be a dominant or
servient estate for a different servitude.
20. Queensborough Land Co. v. Cazeaux, 136 La. 724, 67 So. 641, L.R.A. 1916B
1201, Ann. Cas. 1916D 1248 (1915) ; Hill v. Ross, 166 La. 581, 117 So. 725
(1928) ; Ouachita Home Site & Realty Co. v. Collie, 189 La. 521, 179 So. 841
(1938). See also McGuffy v. Weil, 240 La. 758, 125 So.2d 154 (1960).
21. Edwards v. Wiseman, 198 La. 382, 3 So.2d 661 (1941).
22. 240 La. 794, 125 So.2d 365 (1961).
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frontal setback requirement by approximately twenty-seven feet.
When the plaintiff sought an injunction to prevent this viola-
tion, the defendant contended that existing violations had al-
ready destroyed the whole original scheme of the development.
The evaluation of whether the unopposed violations are suf-
ficient to constitute a waiver or relinquishment of the building
restrictions must be individualized on the facts of each case. In
the present case, the Supreme Court agreed with the two lower
courts in concluding that there had not been a waiver or aban-
donment, and they enforced the restriction. It is not the purpose
of these comments to examine the statistics on the number and
degree of the existing violations or the admissibility of evidence
problem, but rather to discuss three points which were not crit-
ical issues in this case. They do raise interesting questions of
law, and could be critical in later cases.
The first point of interest is the defendant's attack against
the entire scheme of the original development, in his contention
that there had been a waiver or abandonment of all the building
restrictions. Since the Supreme Court concluded that the exist-
ing violations of the front line setback (5 violations) and of the
side line requirement (4 violations) were relatively minor or so
little as to be negligible, there was no need, as a practical matter,
to break down the defendant's contention. 28 It might possibly be
inferred that the court accepted the defendant's presentation of
considering the question of waiver or abandonment with refer-
ence to the whole plan including all the restrictions at the same
time. If this approach were adopted, and if the facts would
show a great many serious violations of only the side line re-
quirement, would this mean a waiver also of the front line set-
back? And if both the side line and front line requirements had
been violated sufficiently to constitute a waiver, would this mean
that the subdivision could no longer be considered as residential?
and so forth. The leading Louisiana case of Edwards v. Wise-
man 24 was very clear and emphatic in the individualization of
each restriction, and it would seem best to keep it that way.
The second point of interest is the defendant's companion
contention that the abandonment of the original scheme was ac-
companied and confirmed by "an entirely new and different
23. As was done by the court of appeal; see 115 So.2d 622, 626-627 (1959).




scheme" which had "emerged in its stead. '25 Again, for prac-
tical purposes, since the court affirmed the injunctive relief to
the plaintiff, there was no need to go into the questions of
whether and how a new scheme of development could "emerge."
There might be some interesting speculation on these points, in-
cluding a comparison with the prescriptive acquisition of certain
servitudes; the tacit "emergence" of a whole scheme of building
restrictions for a residential subdivision would indeed be a novel
but unfounded idea in Louisiana law.
The third point of interest is the possible implication that
a plaintiff must show damage in order to enjoin the proposed
violation of a building restriction. In affirming the injunctive
relief in the present case, the court asserted "for obviously he
would be materially and adversely affected in the enjoyment
of his home"'12 although this element was not made any part
of the ratio decidendi in the court of appeal. Building restric-
tions have been assimilated to servitudes2  and it should not
be necessary to show damage in order to prevent the violation
of a servitude. In a very exceptional case, the court has awarded
damages instead of injunctive relief, 28 but this does not detract
from the right to enforce property interests. In view of the
fact that the building restriction scheme generally has a value
interest which can be presumed, it is a different situation if
the plaintiff should have an affirmative burden of proving dam-
age in order to prevent a violation. And what would the man
do who wanted to enjoin a commercial enterprise in his residen-
tially restricted neighborhood when the abandonment of that
restriction might well give his property much greater value for
commercial purposes?
Another case which stirred considerable interest in the sub-
ject of building restrictions was McGuffy v. Weil.2 19 The owner
of a large corner lot sold a strip on the side, and in a recorded
companion document the corner lot was subjected to a residential
restriction which "shall constitute a covenant running with the
land and shall be binding upon appearer and all subsequent
owners thereof." In subsequent sales of the corner lot, the re-
striction was not mentioned.
25. 125 So.2d at 367.
26. Id. at 371.
27. Ouachita Home Site & Realty Co. v. Collie, 189 La. 521, 179 So. 841
(1938).
28. Adams v. Town of Ruston, 194 La. 403, 193 So. 688 (1940).
29. 240 La. 758, 125 So.2d 154 (1960).
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Building restrictions have long been assimilated to predial
servitudes.3 0 This is reiterated in the present case by the court's
holding that the restrictive covenant involved was a "continuous
nonapparent servitude" and could be established only by a
"title."'3 The court clarified the point that this title refers to
the transaction creating the servitude or building restriction,
and not to the subsequent transfers of the property. Since the
language of the document was clear and unequivocal, the build-
ing restriction constituted a servitude or real obligation running
with the land 3 2 binding on subsequent transferees. Although
building restrictions are generally established by the original
owners of a new subdivision, this is not an exclusive method,
and there appears no reason why a servitude or a building re-
striction cannot be established on a single servient estate for





In Boyet v. Perrymcn' the court dealt again with the problem
of heirs who seek to dispute the title to property conveyed by
the person from whom they inherit.2 The plaintiffs brought an
action of slander of title which was converted by the defendants
into a petitory action. The plaintiffs' grandfather owned half
of a quarter section. He conveyed 10 acres taken from this tract
to the defendant. When the seller died, the judgment of posses-
sion in his succession sent the heirs into possession of the entire
tract, without excepting the portion which had been sold. By
successive conveyances, the plaintiff's father acquired the inter-
est of his six brothers and sisters. The plaintiffs contended that
they had acquired ownership of the 10-acre tract by prescrip-
30. Ouachita Home Site & Realty Co. v. Collie, 189 La. 521, 179 So. 841
(1938).
31. LA. CIvmI CODE arts. 727, 728, 766 (1870).
32. See also LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2015 (1870).
33. Cf. the individual servitude of prohibition of building above a particular
height, mentioned in LA. CIVIL CODE art. 728 (1870).
*Member, Baton Rouge Bar, Special Lecturer, Louisiana State University
Law School.
1. 240 La. 339, 123 So.2d 79 (1960).
2. See, for example, Mims v. Sample, 191 La. 677, 186 So. 66 (1938);
Chevalley v. Pettit, 115 La. 407, 39 So. 113 (1905).
